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There is  a literature (e.g.,  Allaz and Vila,  1992 and Hughes and Kao,  1997) showing that in  an 
oligopolistic context, the presence of a futures market induces firms to use it in order to increase its 
market share. The consequence of this behavior is  that the total quantity supplied by the industry 
increases,  thus  making  the  oligopolistic  outcome  closer  to  the  competitive  equilibrium.  In  the 
present work, we propose a model to study the interaction of  spot and futures markets that does not 
imply this pro-competitive effect. The model is the same as in Allaz and Vila in the sense that firms 
have infinitely many moments to trade in the futures market before the spot market takes place. We 
analyze the equilibria in the infinite case directly and show that many equilibria emerge in a kind of 
folk-theorem result (but ours is not a repeated game). The equilibrium in which firms do not use the 
forward market is particularly robust as it satisfies the most demanding definition of renegotiation-
proofuess.  Furthermore, if firms  are  allowed to  buy in  the  futures  market,  they  can sustain the 
monopolistic outcome in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium (notice that there is  only one period in 
the spot market). We also study the role of information in the model and argue that our results fit 
better stylized facts of  some industries like the power market in the u.K. 
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acknowledged 1  Introduction 
The introduction of futures markets has been most commonly justified as a 
way for firms to hedge against fluctuations in the price.  Other justifications 
deal with arbitrage reasons.  More recently, the strategic interaction between 
futures and spot markets has been analyzed.  In a first  attempt, the inter-
action is  due to the way in which positions in one market affect the costs 
in the other (Williams,  1989).  The second approach is  based in a work by 
Allaz and ViI a (1992) (from now on, A&V) where, in an oligopolistic context, 
these authors show that firms  use the futures markets as  a way to commit 
to a  quantity,  thus forcing  Cournot competition in the spot market in the 
residual demand.  The result is that all firms have an incentive to do so, with 
an increase in the total quantity supplied by the industry. When the number 
of moments to hold positions in the futures markets before the spot market 
tend to infinity, the total quantity is the same as in perfect competition.  In 
a  later work,  Hughes  and Kao  (1997)  (H&K)  argue that this result holds 
only if there is  perfect observability.  Without observability, the equilibrium 
is  again the Cournot behavior. 
The  above  result  suggests  that,  in the  presence  of  a  futures  market, 
oligopolies tend to be more competitive.  In particular, the presence of trades 
in the futures  market would be an indication that this is  indeed the case. 
Moreover, if the futures markets is transparent one must expect more activ-
ity than if the market is  opaque.  However,  the case of the liberalization of 
the power market in England and Wales  does  not reflect  this pattern.  In 
this sector, the introduction of a futures markets (Contracts for  Differences 
CfD) didn't seem to have had this pro-competitive effect (see OXERA, 1994) 
although positions were actually taken in this market.  Furthermore, when 
a more transparent market was introduced (the Electricity Forward Agree-
ments, EFA) , firms  still preferred the use of the much more opaque CdF's. 
For instance, in 1998 the coverture ofthe CdF's was near 90% of the market, 
while the EFAs accounted for less than 30%  (Power UK estimates). 
In the present work, we propose a model to study the interaction of spot 
and forward markets that doesn't imply a pro-competitive effect.  The model 
is the same as in A& V in the sense that firms have infinitely many moments 
to trade in the futures market before the spot market takes place.  We analyze 
the equilibria in the infinite case directly (as oppose to taking the limit of 
the finite  cases)  and show that many equilibria emerge.  The equilibrium 
in which firms  do not use the forward market (and the overall result is  the 
Cournot outcome) is particularly robust (it is renegotiation-proof).  If  firms 
are allowed not only to sell, but also to buy in the futures market, a possibility 
not contemplated in A&V,  then the monopoly outcome is  sustained in a 
2 renegotiation-proof equilibrium.  Hence,  the effect  of introducing a futures 
market not only may not have  a  pro-competitive effect,  but may worsen 
things off. 
Then we analyze the role of observability and show that, even in the one 
period case,  the result of H&K was  based on a hidden assumption that is 
not likely to hold  (they do not consider the sensitivity of the price in the 
futures  markets to changes in the quantities offered by the firms).  When 
the assumption is removed, the effects are totally different, and observability 
makes no difference unless the price in the futures market is insensitive with 
respect to changes in quantities. If  firms are risk averse, they have indeed an 
incentive to sell in the futures market, but they may restrict themselves to 
sell only to get the optimal insurance.  When we  combine these results with 
the standard analysis of repeated games  (when the spot market interaction 
is repeated infinitely many times) we have that firms mayor may not sell in 
the futures markets, without implying a pro-competitive effect.  Finally, the 
possible collusive behavior of firms may be better implemented in real life in 
the more opaque market. 
In section 2 we  present the basic  model.  In section 3,  we  analyze the 
many-periods model.  Next, in section 4, we discuss on the role of observabil-
ity.  In section 5 we show the case of uncertainty and show the complications 
that arise, even with risk neutral firms.  Section 6 concludes. 
2  The basic model 
Consider a duopoly producing an homogeneous good competing a la Cournot 
with zero costs (until section 5 zero costs are a notational simplification of 
constant marginal costs, w.l.o.g.)  and facing a demand given by P =  A - q. 
Suppose now that there is a futures market in which both firms may sell part 
of their production.  Denote by Si  and fi  the quantities sold in the spot and 
futures market respectively (qi  =  Si + fi). If  positions in the forward market 
are observable, given !I and 12,  in the spot market firm i solves: 
max  PSi 
s.t.  P =  A -!I  - 12 - SI - S2 
Si  =  qi - fi 
Which gives·  q.  =  A+2fi-fz  p =  A-b-f2 
•  t  3'  3 
Anticipating this reaction, firms' position in the futures market is  calcu-




qi  =  A+2~i-fj 
P =  A-f~-f2 
The solution to this problem is li  =  A~fj.  Solving the whole problem, 
one finds  Ji  =  p  =  Si  =  ~, qi  =  ~A, and IIi =  225A2.  The equilibrium 
is  thus showing a  pro-competitive effect  of futures  market as the Cournot 
equilibrium without forward market is qi  = P = 1, with IIi =  ~2. This is the 
result in Allaz and Vila (1992). 
Without observability, Hughes and Kao (1997) conclude a totally different 
story. If  forward positions are not observable, the reaction functions derived 
from the first of the previous problems require that non observed variables 
be conjectural: 
A + li - qj 
qi  =  2 
Where qj  is  anticipated to follow the same reaction: 
,  A + Ij - q~ 
qj =  2 
Solving this second system, taking into account that in equilibrium con-
jectures have to be correct, one finds: 
,  A + 2/: - Ij 
qi  =  3 
Finally, reaction functions become: 
A +  ~/i +  ~/: - Ij 
qi  =  3 
Then, the problem of deciding the positions in the forward market is: 
max 
s.t. 
The solution of this problem gives li  =  fj;fj .  In equilibrium Ij  =  Ij, 
leading to the Cournot solution with 11  = h  =  O.  Hence observability is a 
necessary condition to obtain the pro-competitive effect  in the presence of 
futures markets. 
4 3  The many periods model.  Two very differ-
ent conclusions 
According to A&V, if firms are allowed to hold positions at multiple periods in 
the forward market, the pro-competitive effect is enhanced. Furthermore, the 
competitive outcome is the limit of the equilibrium outcomes as the number 
of periods T goes to infinity.  The equilibrium is given by p =  Si =  if =  3~T' 
qi  =  Al:ir.  Notice that the position in the futures market in every period 
Uf) is  the same.  As T  goes to infinity, prices goes to zero and total future 
positions converge to A,  although in every period the position becomes zero 
(  infinitesimal) . 
The interest of the above result is  limited as  we  will  argue.  There are 
many games in which the limit of equilibria in finite versions of a model does 
not coincide with the equilibria in the infinite version.  Game Theory shows 
many examples of this phenomenon.  Our point to the model is precisely that 
it constitutes another such an example.  To  show this, consider, then, that 
T =  00.  In proposition 1 we sustain the Cournot outcome as  an equilibrium 
of the game,  but before we  need to be more precise about the number and 
timing of the periods to hold positions in the futures market.  For this, we 
will consider that the game starts at moment t  =  0,  that the spot market 
takes place at moment t  = 1,  and that positions in the futures market can 
take place in discrete amounts at any time in the interval [0, 1).  Since our 
result will be based in the sustainability of holding no positions in the futures 
market, we  need to find  a way to detect deviations from this behavior (see 
that in the equilibrium above, in the limit case, positions in every period are 
zero).  There are several possibilities.  One is to define and evaluate a function 
ii (t) that measures the positions in the futures market by firm i at each point 
in time (in this case, we want it to be zero in our equilibrium instead of 4  as 
in the limit case of A&V). However, this approach has many problems as one 
has to define what it means a strategy like  "hold no positions in the future 
market, except if  the rival does, in which case, sell in this market immediately 
after this observation"  (see Myerson,  89  for  the difficulties in defining this 
kind of strategies in continuous time models).  To overcome this difficulty, in 
equilibrium firms revise their strategy at times tl =  ~ , t2 = tl +  ~(l-tl)'  ... ' 
tk  =  tk-l +~(1-tk-l)'  ... That is, we divide the interval [0,1) in subintervals 
such that each one has a length of  ~ of the remaining time.  Denote by if 
the quantity that firm  i  sells  in the futures  market at time t.  Finally let 
F/  =  Er<t iT  be the accumulated futures positions by firm i  at time t  and 
define Fe  Ff + Fi and F  =  Fl (i.e., total of futures positions at the time 
of the spot market). 
5 Proposition 1  Let the duopoly game  be  described with the interval [0,1)  as 
the time to  hold positions in the futures market.  Then,  the Coumot outcome 
is sustainable in equilibrium. 
Proof:  Consider the following strategy: 
(i) Firm i holds no positions in the futures market in t E [0, t l ], (Ft
1  =  0). 
The game is said to be in state C (after Cournot) at the beginning of play. 
(ii)  The game remains in state C  at time t  as  long as  Fitk  =  0 for  all 
tf  ::; tk ::; t, where tf is the last period in which a change of state occurred. If 
the game is in state C at time tt play ffl  =  O. 
(iii) If  the game is  in state C and firm j  plays flk  > 0,  the game goes to 
state Pj  (after punishment). 
(iv) If  the game has changed from state C to state Pj  at moment t,  with 
tk < t ::;  tk+l, then firm i  plays f:k+
1  =  i (A - Ftk), where Ftk  is the total of 
positions in the futures market by both firms at that moment. 
(v)  After the game has changed from state C to state Pj  at moment t  as 
in (iv), it changes back to state C if firm i  plays fitk+l  =  i  (A - Ftk) and firm 
j  plays f?+l  =  O.  If only firm  k( = i, j) plays differently, the state changes 
to state Pk .  If both play differently, the game still goes back to state C. 
(vi)  In the spot market,  firms  sell  Si  =  A3F ,  where  F  is  the total of 
positions in the futures market at time one. 
This strategy profile gives  each firm the Cournot payoff.  To  prove the 
proposition, we have to show that at no point there is a profitable deviation 
by one firm.  Consider, first, the best deviation in the first period for firm j, 
anticipating firm i's reaction and assuming no further deviations by any of 






A - qi  - % 
f ~l + s· 
J  J 
ff2  + Si 
~(A  - fr) 
A - fr - fit2 
3 
The solution to this problem gives  fr =  ~, ff2  =  ~ =  Sk  =  p,  qj  =  4, 
A  A2  A2.  A2  A2  'fi  qi  =  3"'  IIj  =  12' IIi =  18·  Smce IIj  =  12  <  ""9'  the Cournot s  pro  ts, 
we  conclude that no one-shot deviations are profitable in state C with no 
future positions having taken place in the past.  The same conclusion holds 
6 for one-period deviations at any other time T  since at the beginning of each 
period in which strategies may change the game is  identical to the original 
(the only difference  being that A is  replaced with A - FT,  to account for 
possible past futures positions).  Again, a deviation by firm j  when the game 
is at state Pj  is  not profitable because it would work as  a deviation in state 
C, but with firm j  expecting the Cournot outcome of the residual demand 
after substracting the total of positions in the futures market and, thus, the 
similar maximization problem will prove any deviation unprofitable.  Finally, 
deviations in more that one period will induce a punishment that makes each 
one of the one-period deviations unprofitable .• 
This result has the resemblance of Folk Theorems in Game Theory.  How-
ever, the infinite version of the basic model is not a repeated game, and Folk 
theorems cannot be invoked to prove proposition 1.  In particular, sub  games 
are different if they come after a different history in terms of the accumulated 
futures positions.  Hence, subgames in later periods are, in general, a reduced 
version of the original game (because of the reduced residual demand), and 
one has to make sure that payoffs  in the remaining game are sufficient to 
sustain punishments. Nevertheless, we can obtain a Folk Theorem-like result 
in the sense that any price between perfect competition and Cournot can be 
obtained as an equilibrium, and with arbitrary distribution of profits between 
the firms.  To see this, consider the price p  E  [0, 4], and the total quantity 
q = A - p.  Consider, then, quantities ql  and q2 such that ql +  q2 = q, and dis-
tribute them between the spot and the futures market solving the following 
system of equations: 
Then, the strategy that consists of selling hand h in the first interval 
[0, t1J,  and supporting the Cournot outcome of the residual demand in the 
game starting at tl is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
In this  work  we  concentrate on the robustness  of the pro-competitive 
effect of forward markets.  To this end we remark the following properties of 
the equilibrium in proposition 1. 
Remark 1.  The strategy is  very simple although formally  it requires 
some elaboration.  Firms hold no positions in the futures market unless the 
rival does, in which case the later sells in this market as well. 
7 Remark 2.  During the punishment period, the deviating firm gets hurt 
while the rival benefits with respect to the strategy that forgets the deviation 
and continues as in the original plan. 
This last remark provides the intuition why the equilibrium is renegotiation-
proof as formally defined next and stated in proposition 2. 
Definition  1.  A  subgame perfect  equilibria  8  is  said to be strongly 
renegotiation proof (SRP) if there is  no other subgame perfect equilibrium 
8'  and a subgame 9 such, for  all players ut (8)  > ut (s').  Where ut (.)  is the 
utility for player i of following a given strategy conditioned to the game being 
in subgame g. 
This concept of SRP is  originally defined for  repeated games (see Bern-
heim and Ray,  1989 and Farrell and Maskin,  1989).  Here we  presented its 
natural extension to standard extensive form games.  Note that the definition 
of SRP is very strong.  One equilibrium may fail the test because there exists 
another subgame perfect equilibrium which, conditioned on some subgame, 
gives higher payoffs, but nothing is said about the viability of this other equi-
librium. Weaker versions of renegotiation-proofness have been suggested, but 
we  don't need to bother about that since, as proposition 2 shows, the equi-
librium described in proposition 1 already satisfies this strongest version of 
renegotiation proofness. 
Proposition 2  The equilibrium described in proposition 1 is a strongly renegotiation-
proof equilibrium. 
Proof: It is enough to check that there is no other subgame perfect strat-
egy profile that gives both firms more profits than the equilibrium. 
Case 1.  At the beginning of the game:  Cournot is the only equilibrium in 
the spot market and any equilibrium in which future positions are not zero 
necessarily causes the price and total profits to drop.  Hence at least one firm 
losses. 
Case 2.  In a subgame when a punishment takes place:  Suppose that the 
game is in a subgame that starts in stage Pj .  Total profits are reduced if the 
total quantity sold in the futures market increases.  The only possibility, then, 
for  total profits to increase is  that firm i  reduces its position in the futures 
market (in equilibrium firm j  has no such positions in this subgame).  But if 
firm i  reduces its positions in the futures market, its profits are reduced.  To 
8 see this, notice that fi =  HA - Ft), solves the following problem: 
p  = 
max  pqi 
A + 2fi - Ft 
3 
A - fi - Ft 
3 
This is the problem of calculating the best strategy in the futures market 
for  firm i given the residual demand A - Ft, given that firm j  holds no more 
futures positions, and given that both firms compete a la Cournot in the spot 
market.  I.e., the strategy in state ~  requires firm i  to use its best position 
compatible with the equilibrium behavior.  Given this, no other equilibrium 
strategy will give this firm more profits. 
Case 3.  Subgames after a  punishment stage:  These subgames are the 
same as case 1,  except for the size of the residual demand, which is irrelevant 
for the argument .• 
In a more general setting, firms would be able to both sell and buy in the 
futures market.  In this case,  firms  can do better if each produces half the 
monopoly quantity.  This is shown in the next proposition. 
Proposition 3  If  firms are allowed to buy in the futures market.  The monopoly 
price and quantity can be  achieved in a strongly renegotiation-proof subgame 
perfect equilibrium. 
Proof:  The proof is  the same as  propositions 1 and 2,  except that we 
make f;l =  -~. The negative sign meaning a buy.  One has only to check 
that, by doing so, the result is indeed the monopolistic outcome. For this, see 
that if firms follow the strategy, the solution in the spot market requires (see 
the basic model)'  q.  =  A+2/;-fi  P =  A-fl-f2  which  in this case it means 
•  t  3'  3'  , 
A  A·  hi' d  .•  qi  =  4' P =  2' l.e., t  e monopo y pnce an  quantity. 
4  The role of observability 
In this section we study the role of observability in more detail.  According 
to H&K, the pro-competitive effect in A&V takes place only if positions in 
the futures market are observed.  If  they are not, the equilibrium reverts to 
Cournot.  However,  their result is  based in a hidden assumption.  Namely, 
that the observation of the action made by other firms  is the only way in 
which firms learn about their behavior.  In general this is  not true.  In our 
(and their)  model,  firms  observe prices.  From them, they can deduce the 
9 quantities.  Next we formalize this argument and show that A&V's result still 
holds in this case.  Then we include an explicit formulation of H&K's hidden 
assumption in the model and show that, contrary to these authors,  when 
firms have no information (direct or indirect) about the futures market, the 
equilibrium reverts, not to Cournot, but to perfect competition.  We discuss 
the implications of these two results in comparison to H&K. 
4.1  Futures market is sensitive 
To better understand the argument, start with the Cournot equilibrium in 
H&K when there is  no observability (we  are in the basic model with only 
one period to sell in the futures market): !I = 12  = 0,  Si = qi = P =  ~. If 
the second firm decides to sell 12 > 0, the price will change (the no-arbitrage 
condition implies only one price).  This is  true even if there is  no reaction 
by the first firm to this action, since firm 2 will produce in the spot market 
according to the reaction function 
as 12 > 0 and SI =  ~, we have 
A-h- d  A  1  A 
q2 = 12 + S2 = 12 +  2  3  ="3 + 212  > "3 
This higher quantity can only be sold at a lower price p <  ~.  Since the 
price is  observed by firm 1,  it can deduce firm 2's action.  Hence, firm 2 can 
count on a  reaction by firm  1.  To  compute the equilibrium,  consider the 
following facts: 
(i)  An equilibrium price p  in the spot market means a total equilibrium 
quantity of A - p. 
(ii)  Total quantities offered by the two firms  (ql  and q2)  must be divided 
between the two markets in a way so that (a)  spot quantities constitute a 
Cournot equilibrium in the residual demand after discounting futures' posi-
tions and (b) futures' positions are the best decision for each firm when the 
spot decisions are anticipated. 
These are precisely the conditions that lead to the result in A&V.  Thus 
we  have proved the following proposition: 
Proposition 4  Suppose  that two  firms  compete  as  in the  basic  model  de-
scribed above.  Then,  the observability of the positions in the futures market 
makes no difference in the equilibrium. 
10 Naturally,  the same conclusion holds for  any number of periods in the 
futures market.  In  other words,  for  finitely many periods (and its limit in 
the infinite case) in the futures market, the result in A&V is independent of 
observability and so is our result for  infinitely many periods. 
4.2  Futures market is not sensitive 
Another possibility is that the demand in the futures market does not react 
to deviations made by the firms.  This is  an explicit modeling of the hidden 
assumption in H&K, and implies the possibility of different prices in the two 
markets as  a result of deviations form equilibrium.  The model then must 
not allow any arbitrage between them.  However, in equilibrium, both prices 
have to coincide since the equilibrium must be anticipated by all players in 
the game. 
First we see why Cournot is not an equilibrium in this situation. Consider, 
then, that firm 1 changes plans to sell f1  > O.  Because of the insensitivity, the 
price in the futures market remains PI = 1. If  this is the case, firm 1 better 
sells everything the demand can absorb in this market, !I = A - S2  = 2:. 
Profits change from  12  to 2:2.  In the spot market, the residual demand is 
given by Ps  =  A-!I  -S2 =  0,  if firm 2 does not change its strategy (S2 =  1)· 
The equilibrium is given in the next proposition: 
Proposition 5  Suppose  that  two  firms  compete  as  in the  basic  model  de-
scribed above.  If the price in the futures  market is insensitive to  variations 
in the quantity, in equilibrium !I + h =  A, Ps  =  PI  =  Si =  O. 
Proof:  We show that if P > 0, there is no equilibrium.  Suppose that firms 
produce Si  and fi'  such that the price is  p  =  A - SI  - S2  - !I - h  >  0, 
both firms have an incentive to sell all they can in the futures market at that 
price.  This gives f' = n  +  f~ =  A - p > !I + h  if for a firm i, Si is greater 
that zero.  This means that p > 0 is not an equilibrium as at least one firm 
is  deviating (there is a firm j  with fj =f.  h). Hence, the equilibrium requires 
!I + h =  A, Ps  =  PI =  Si =  o  .• 
A  possible objection to this version  of the model  (apart form  the in-
sensitivity assumption)  may be the following.  Consider again the strategy 
consisting of not selling in the futures market and selling the Cournot quan-
tity in the spot.  Even if there are many agents in the futures market, some 
of them should detect the deviation consisting of a  firm  selling a  positive 
amount in this market.  Knowing this, they have to anticipate a lower price 
in the spot market and, consequently, negotiate a lower price in the futures 
11 market as well.  In other words, the assumption of an insensitive demand in 
the futures market is contradictory with the rest of the model.  There are at 
least two possible justifications. If  there are many agents, the deviating firm 
may sell only a little to each of them, who observes then a small quantity 
and anticipates a small change in the price. If  this amount is  small enough, 
the analysis may ignore it.  Alternatively, the action of selling ii = °  may be 
interpreted as an ideal description of a reality that is  closer to fi  =  E,  where 
E  is  arbitrarily small.  In this case,  the deviation of selling small quantities 
to different agents may not be interpreted as a deviation at all.  If  there are 
many periods to take positions in the futures market, the result is  exactly 
the same.  Firms will sell everything in their first opportunity, regardless of 
whether in posterior moments in the futures market agents learn what has 
happened. 
4.3  Partial and random sensitivity 
For a strategy profile (/I, 12, SI, S2) to be an equilibrium candidate, it must be 
that PI =  Ps  =  A - /I - 12 - SI - S2·  Consider a deviation from this strategy 
if > /I, which induces a price in the spot market P~ =  A - if - 12 - SI - S2· 
We  can model partial sensitivity as  Pt  =  PI - 6 (f~ - /I), where Pt is  the 
price in the futures market if the deviation takes place.  Notice that if 6 =  1, 
PI  =  P~ (case 1), and that if 6 =  0,  PI  =  PI  (case 2).  However, in this way, 
firms  still may deduce the quantities in the spot market trough the price, 
taking into account the correction factor 6.  The result is the same as case 1. 
In order to make the hypothesis of partial sensitivity meaningful,  one 
may introduce a  random factor.  This has the effect  of making it difficult 
for players to know whether a given price is  due to a position in the futures 
market  or to this random factor.  Then let PI  =  Ps + 6,  where  6 is  now 
a  random variable with mean 6m  E  [o,~].  The equilibrium is  now  more 
interesting in the sense that is  midway between the result in A& V and the 
perfect competition. 
Proposition 6  Let the basic model include the randomness indicated above. 
Then,  the  equilibrium  (in  interior solutions)  is  given  by  fi  =  A+;8m  and 
S  - - P  - A-68m  i-Ps - 1- 5  . 
Proof:  The equilibrium must satisfy (i)  and (ii)(a) in case 1.  Condition 
(ii)(b) must be replaced with PI  =  Ps + 6.  This means that, in the futures 
market, firm i  must solve 
12 s.t. Pi  Ps + 0 
A-JI-h 
Ps  =  3 
which gives the solution fi = A+;6m  and Si = Ps  = Pi =  A-~6m .• 
Notice that  £1  >  A+96m  >  £1  and °  <  A-60m  <  £1.  The result in case  2- 5  -5  - 5-5 
1 (right hand side of these expressions)  is  obtained with Om  =  0,  while the 
result in case 2 (left hand side) is obtained with Om  =  ~. 
5  Uncertainty 
Suppose now that the demand is  not known until firms compete in the spot 
market. If  firms continue to be risk neutral, it would be optimal for them not 
to sell in the futures markets and produce the Cournot in the spot market 
given the realization of the demand.  The change with respect to the model 
without uncertainty is  the complication that arises when one tries to sup-
port that strategy as  an equilibrium that is  not only subgame perfect but 
strongly renegotiation proof as well.  Among other things, one has to check 
what happens in subgames that start after firms  have sold some quantities 
in the futures markets.  Without uncertainty, we were able to argue that the 
remaining game was a reduced version of the original one, and that one could 
apply the same arguments as before to rule out more positions in the forward 
market.  However, with uncertainty, this is  not the case, since it can be that 
for some realizations of the demand, the positions already hold in the futures 
market are more than what the demand can absorb at a positive price.  This 
means that we have a corner solution in the spot market.  Furthermore, since 
the uncertainty becomes  bigger relative to the size of the residual demand 
as we consider subgames with more positions in the forward market, we can-
not restrict ourselves to the cases in which the uncertainty is  small enough 
compared to the original demand in order to neglect these cases of corner 
solutions.  In other words, the remaining game is not a reduced version of the 
original. 
To  simplify  things,  consider  a  simple  way  of introducing uncertainty, 
namely,  that the term A  in the demand is  a  random variable that takes 
values a or b (a > b)  with equal probability.  Now we can state and prove the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 7  Let the duopoly game  be  described with the interval [0,1)  as 
the  time to  hold  positions  in the  futures  market and  with the  uncertainty 
13 as  described  above.  Then,  the  Coumot outcome in each  realization  of the 
demand is sustainable in a strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. 
Proof:  Consider the strategy in proposition 1,  except for the following: 
(iv)' If  the game has changed from state C to state Pj  at moment t, with 
tk < t  ::;  t k+1, then firm i  plays  fi
tk
+
1  calculated to be the best response by 
firm i  to the strategy that involves no more forward positions by firm j. 
(  v)' After the game has changed from state C to state Pj  at moment t 
as in (iv)', it changes back to state C if firm i  plays f:k+
1  and firm j  plays 
f]k+1  =  o.  If only firm k (= i, j) plays differently, the state changes to state 
Pk .  If  both play differently, the game still goes back to state C. 
(vi)' In the spot market, firms sell Si = max { a; f ,0  } or Si = max { b; f, O}, 
depending on the realization of the demand, where f  is the total of positions 
in the futures market. 
The proof consists of showing that this strategy is,  in fact,  a  strongly 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium.  The complete proof with the details about 
corner solutions are left to the appendix .• 
If  firms  are allowed to buy in the futures market, they can do better. If 
positions in the futures market are h = h  = f  (in the symmetric case), in 
the spot market, the solution will be Pa  =  Sa =  a-;2t,  Pb  =  Sb  =  b- 32t ,  and 
then Pt  =  a+b 6-4f .  The expression for  joint profits in the futures market is 
2 GPaSa +  ~PbSb) - 2Pt f  with solution f  =  - at
b
.  This implies Pa  =  Sa  = 
5a-b  5b-a  + f  7a-b  d  + f  7b-a  N  t·  th t  12'  Pb =  Sb = 12'  qa = Sa  = ~,an qb = Sb  = ~.  0  Ice  a 
qa >  ~, qb < ~, half the monopolist outcome in the two possible realizations 
of the demand.  Thus, in the presence of uncertainty, firms  cannot support 
the monopolist outcome, but they can improve upon Cournot. This outcome 
can be sustained in a strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as a corollary 
of proposition 7, just repeating the same proof. 
Corollary 1. Let the duopoly game be described with the interval [0,1) 
as the time to hold positions in the futures market and with the uncertainty 
as described above.  Then, the outcome qa = Sa +  f =  7~~b, qb =  Sb +  f =  7~~a 
is sustainable in a strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. 
The case of non zero costs makes a difference in this case.  Until now one 
needed only to replace A with A - c to consider the case of positive marginal 
costs and observe no difference in the results.  However,  with uncertainty, 
the possibility of b - c  being negative requires that one has to take into 
consideration the corner solution in which the price is  bellow costs, but still 
positive, but the quantity in the spot market is zero.  This complicates a lot 
14 the study of corner solutions for  proposition 7 and its corollary.  Obviously, 
by continuity,  small costs will  make no difference in the proofs.  Since our 
goal is to provide a counter-argument to existing literature, we prefer to show 
clarity rather that generality. 
5.1  Risk aversion 
If firms  are risk averse,  they will  be willing to reduce their risk by selling 
part of their production at a known price before the spot market takes place. 
This means that firms  have a clear incentive to use the futures market.  In 
the simple model of only a limited number of periods in the futures markets, 
this effect enhances the strategic effect studied above.  However, in the case 
of an undetermined or  infinite  number of moments to sell  in the futures 
market, there is  a more complicated interaction.  Since our goal is to study 
the robustness of the pro-competitive effect of these markets, we concentrate 
in the possibility of maintaining the Cournot outcome even in the case of 
uncertainty as a robust equilibrium, as we argued in the perfect information 
case. 
Since the uncertainty is  resolved in the spot market.  Firms would play 
the Cournot outcome in each realization of the demand after substracting 
the positions in the futures market.  The absence of a pro-competitive effect, 
understood in the strongest sense,  means that futures market positions are 
zero.  However, this may not be the best thing for  the firms.  Since they are 
risk averse, they may be willing to sell part of their production in advance at 
the cost of increasing the total quantity because of Cournot competition in 
the spot market. They may gain in utility even if they lose in expected profits. 
In other words, in may be Pareto improving to have some quantities sold in 
the futures market.  Consumers benefit from a lower price and firms  benefit 
from a reduction in risk.  This effect, however, is more properly attributed to 
the risk aversion of firms rather that to the presence of the futures market (see 
that with risk neutrality, there may be no positions in the futures markets 
as we saw in the previous sections). 
6  Conclusion 
An  existing literature shows  a  pro-competitive  effect  when introducing a 
futures market in an oligopolistic industry.  We have shown that this do not 
need to be the case.  In fact, the presence of the futures market may have the 
opposite effect.  Our model fits  better some stylized facts found in the U.K. 
power market where the use of the futures market is not seeing as having a 
15 pro-competitive effect.  Furthermore, our model is  consistent with the fact 
that firms  prefer the more opaque of the two existing futures  market.  In 
A& V firms prefer the more transparent to gain from showing a commitment 
to sell.  We  have shown that, if markets are sensitive,  this transparency is 
irrelevant for  this strategic behavior.  However, there may be other uses for 
the opaque market. For instance, firms may translate collusive behavior from 
the spot to the futures market, where it cannot be observed by the regulator. 
This behavior may be in the form of buying in the futures market (as seen 
in proposition 2 and corollary 1)  or maybe by provoking a high volatility in 
the spot market to induce smaller firms to use the futures market, where the 
colluding firms have a dominant position.  This last point was mentioned as a 
possibility in OXERA, 1994, and its formalization is left for future research. 
Other lines of investigations include the extension to a bigger number of 
firms and to a more general demand and cost functions.  Our point was more 
to show a counter-argument to the previous literature than to be as general 
as possible. 
One may think that, if collusion is possible, then firms will collude in the 
spot market, thus rendering these strategic considerations somehow irrele-
vant.  However, the opportunities and costs of colluding may not be same in 
both markets (for instance if the futures market is opaque to the regulator). 
Finally, our work has immediate implications for  economic policy:  make 
the futures market as transparent as possible and do not allow firms to buy 
in the futures market. 
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17 Appendix 
Proof of proposition 7: 
Case 1.  Interior solutions.  F  :::;  3b2a 
t  I_F_/k_/k+1 
First calculate fi k+1.  For that, notice that SI  = PI =  13  '  , l = a, b 
are the Cournot quantities and prices in the spot market.  Given that, firm i 
solves the following problem in the futures market: 
s.t.  Sa 
Pi 
The solution to this problem gives the following values: 
a + b - 2F - 2lk 
----8----')'-- =  Pi 
7  a - b - 6F - 6ft
k 
_  ) 
Pa  - 24 
7b - a - 6F - 6  Jtk 
Pb  =  24  ) 
Given the reaction of firm i, firm j's best one period deviation is calculated 
solving: 
max  ~ (fJkpi + SaPa)  + ~ (fJkpi + SbPb) 
subject to the above equalities, 






3a - b - 2F 
Pa  =  12 
3b - a - 2F 
Pb  =  12 
18 For Sb = Pb  =  3b-~22F to be positive, it must be the case that F  :s;  3b;-a. 
Profits of firm j  are: 
ITd  IT. (F Jtk  = a + b - 2F  Jtk+1  = a + b - 2F) = 
J  J  'J  6  't  6 
a + b - 2F a + b - 2F  (! (3a - b - 2F)2  !  (3b - a - 2F)2) 
6  12  +  2  12  + 2  12 
If  firms hold no more positions in the futures market, profits will be (see 
that F  ~  3b2
a  < b)  : 
IT~ = IT. (F  f~k = 0 ftk+1  = 0)  = ! (a - F)  2 + ! (b - F)  2 
J  J  'J  't  2  3  2  3 
One can check that IT~ > ITd  as long as F <  a+b  < 3b-a. 
J- J  - 2  2 
Case  2:  3b2a  < F  ~  O.  To alleviate notation, let fJk  =  g, fitk+ 1 =  f. 
Firm i  (risk neutral) solves the following problem in the futures market: 
s.t.  Sa 
P! 
with the solution: 
1  1 
max  :2  (JP! + SaPa) + :2  (JP! + SbPb) 
a-F-g-f 
Pa  =  3 




f = Sa = Pa = ----
4 
a-F-g 
P! =  8 
Given firm i's reaction.  Best deviation for firm j: 
1 
maxgp! + :2saPa, 
t 
subject to the above equalities, i.e., maximize: 
a  - F - 9  1 (a - F _ g)2 
9  8  +:2  4 










Difference in profits for firm j by deviating (IT (deviation) - IT (no deviation)): 
a  - Fa -F  +  ~ (a - F)2 _  ~ (a - F)2 < 0 
3  12  2  6  2  3 
this inequality holds for the values of F is  case this case. 
Case 3:  a ::;  F: 
In this case,  Sa  =  Sb  =  0 which implies zero  prices and no profit from 
selling more. 
Finally, the proof of strongly renegotiation-proofness is analogous to that 
in proposition 2 .• 
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